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Charles Forrester. Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms
Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45.
Solihul, UK: Helion & Company, 2015. Pp. 226.
The Foreword to the British Army’s 2011 doctrine primer suggested
that doctrine was still viewed by many officers as a topic they
would rather avoid.1 Indeed, for many people the mere notion of
the conceptual component of fighting power, the thinking element
of fighting doctrine, is both remote and difficult to comprehend.2
With that in mind, this book is likely to appeal to those who are
fascinated by the interplay between conceptual doctrine and physical
practice in the latter stages of the Second World War.
Monty’s Functional Doctrine attempts to reconcile historiographical
interpretations of the British Army’s methods and performance in the
Anglo-Canadian 21 Army Group by means of an examination and
an explanation of the way Montgomery incorporated best practice
techniques, devised by lower and middle level commanders to produce
a functional, workable and adaptive doctrine for integrated armour
and infantry cooperation. The book, which builds on Forrester’s
doctoral thesis,3 clearly articulates his enthusiasm for the intricacies of
the subject as indicated in his writing style, which is encyclopaedically
detailed. The benefit of Forrester’s methodical and rigourous approach
is that the conclusions he draws are supported by the extensive use of
references, many of which are primary sources.
Forrester contends that agile, capable and adaptable mid-level
commanders, under the mostly benign eye of an omniscient and
supportive Montgomery, were empowered to think conceptually in order
to create doctrine suitable for the terrain and environment facing them in
Europe. I particularly liked the clear explanation of the evolution of the
British Army’s thinking with regard to tanks and infantry in the 1930s,
which led to the separate development of Infantry support tanks, Cruiser
tanks and the motorised infantry. This background contextualises the
problems encountered in integrating the infantry and the armoured
Army Doctrine Publication: Army Doctrine Primer (AC7194). (MOD: 2011), i.
Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) Mike Harwood, “The Conceptual Component,” Air
Power 2014/2015 Engaging in a Changing World (2014): 16-18.
3  
A summary of the key conclusions of Forrester’s thesis can also be found in his
article: Charles Forrester, “Field Marshal Montgomery’s Role in the Creation of
the British 21st Army Group’s Combined Arms Doctrine for the Final Assault on
Germany,” Journal of Military History 78, no. 4 (October 2014).
1  
2  
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forces in the later years of the war. I also enjoyed the explanation of the
thinking necessary to overcome the initial inferiority of British tanks,
guns and anti-tank guns in the wide expanses of the Western Desert:
an environment which offered the opportunity to conduct tank battles
in manoeuvre. Nevertheless, it was a surprise to find the author’s
definition of doctrine (p. 192), fundamental to the understanding of
the book, in the Appendix, which also articulates Forrester’s desire to
debunk the perception of Montgomery as an authoritarian ‘top-down’
commander, unwilling to listen to, or incorporate, the experiences and
ideas of those lower down the command chain.
The description of the interplay necessary, between the
commanders of the infantry and armoured divisions and brigades, to
adapt infantry and armour tactics in order to overcome the enemy is
well handled, as is Forrester’s explanation of the way the lessons from
the fighting in North Africa were misread during the early stages of the
campaign in Normandy. Forrester also shows how Montgomery dealt
with flamboyant and impudent commanders who failed to follow his
direction or embrace a culture where hierarchical centralised command
and control also allowed and encouraged subordinates to improvise (p.
59). That said, in concentrating mostly on the interaction between
infantry and armour, Forrester’s coverage of the doctrinal development
and integration of artillery and air power is noticeably thin.
One of the ideas to emerge from the growing body of literature,
which seeks to rehabilitate the reputation of the British 21st Army
Group, is that air power’s influence has been greatly overestimated.
Some historians have claimed that the air interdiction plan did not
significantly delay German reinforcements getting to Normandy; that
the moral effect of air power was temporary and largely intangible
and could even have been used by the defeated Germans as an excuse
to assuage their humiliation at defeat; that the threat from Typhoon
aircraft was ‘more myth than reality’ and that Gooderson’s belief in
the ‘moral effect’4 of airpower to carry the day is grossly overstated.5
This argument is far from won. While Jonathan Fennell acknowledges
4  
Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe,
1943-1945 (London, UK: Routledge, 1998).
5  
Robert Vogel, “Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some Thoughts on the Interdiction
Plan,” Canadian Military History 3, no. 1 (1994): 37-8, 42, 45; Christopher Evans,
“The Fighter Bomber in the Normandy Campaign: The Role of 83 Group,” Canadian
Military History 8, no. 1: 21, 31; Terry Copp, “21st Army Group in Normandy
Towards a New Balance Sheet,” Canadian Military History 16, no. 1 (2007): 65-67.
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the revisionist arguments, he draws on work by King, to supplement
his analysis to suggest that success or failure was dependent on
morale.6 Certainly, in 1940 and 1941 British and Dominion soldiers
viewed the loss of air superiority as a fundamental constituent of
their defeats.7 Moreover, Fennell has shown, air power did induce
feelings of vulnerability, which resulted in tangible morale effects out
of all proportion to the physical effects.8
Monty’s Functional Doctrine investigates the development of
doctrine and tactical practices of the 21st Army Group in a way that
will interest both academics and those interested in the interplay
between infantry, armour, artillery and air power during the latter
stages of the Second World War. It is a worthy addition to the
historiography that seeks to rehabilitate the reputation of the British
Army in Normandy and beyond. One of the biggest things I took
away after reading the book was that the story is only part told: that
only when the moral effect of artillery and air power on the German
defenders is fully incorporated into the narrative will we garner a
truer picture of the performance of the 21st Army Group. After all
fighting power, as British doctrine currently tells us, is a composite of
the conceptual, physical and moral components.9
david stubbs , independent researcher

6  
Jonathan Fennell, “Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in
the Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second World War,” in Frontline: Combat
and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century, A. King (ed.), 134-166; Anthony King,
The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and TwentyFirst Centuries (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36.
7  
TNA CAB 106/220, Final report of the Bartholomew Committee on lessons to
be learnt from the operations in Flanders. Martin Francis, The Flyer (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 19-20; Air Historical Branch, RAF Campaign in
Crete, May 1941, First Draft, 71-74; D.M. Davin, Official History of New Zealand
in the Second World War 1939-1945: Crete (Wellington: Historical Publications
Branch, 1953), 458; Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (London:
Greenhill Books, 2001), 120; David Stubbs, “Politics and Military Advice: Lessons
from the Campaign in Greece 1941,” Air Power Review 17, no. 3 (2014): 117-118.
8  
Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 55, 60-63, 76-78.
9  
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine (November 2014): 25.
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